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SECTION 38 AND 
THE OPEN COURTS PRINCIPLE
Jeremy Patrick-Justice*
“The open court principle is a cornerstone o f our democracy . . . . 
Section 38 is the antithesis to this fundamental principle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since October of 2001, Hassan Almrei has been held in solitary confinement at a 
Toronto detention centre.2 After a thirty-nine day hunger strike in the fall of 2003, 
the temperature in Almrei’s cell was finally raised from what guards described as 
“very cold” to an acceptable 22 degrees Celsius.3 Unlike almost all other inmates at 
the Metro West Detention Centre, Almrei has never been charged with a crime— 
indeed, he’s never even had an opportunity to examine the evidence used against 
him.4 Currently, Almrei awaits deportation to Syria, the same country that tortured 
Canadian citizen Maher Arar.5 Almrei’s case is not unique, however. At least four 
other Canadian residents6 are currently being detained through the use of govern­
ment-issued “security certificates,” a special power that allows authorities to arrest 
residents on the grounds that they may be a threat to Canadian national security.7 
Those arrested have only one chance to challenge the security certificate, and the
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1 Ottawa Citizen Group Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1303 at para. 44.
2 See Michelle Shephard, “Branded as Terrorist Thread, Men Languish in Toronto Jail” Toronto Star 
(17 July 2004).
3 See “Accused Terrorist Suspect Ends Hunger Strike” Globe and Mail (12 November 2003).
4 See Thomas Walkom, “Terror Suspect Marks Time” Toronto Star (10 February 10 2004).
5 See Gillian Livingston, “Terror Suspect Given Reprieve” Toronto Star (27 November 2003).
6 Others detained on security certificates include Mohamed Harkat, Ernst Zundel, Mahmoud Jaballah, 
Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, and Adil Charkaoui.
7 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 77(1).
government is allowed to introduce secret evidence against them in ex parte hear­
ings.8
An expanded ability to issue security certificates9 is only one feature of recent 
Canadian attempts to fight terrorism. Canadian omnibus legislation known as Bill 
C-36 loosened the restraints on government action after the September 11 attacks. 
Bill C-36 was Canada’s legislative response to the attacks on the World Trade Center 
on September 11, 2001, and was signed into law a few months after the attacks. One 
of the most troubling changes wrought by C-36 was modification of Section 38 of 
the Canada Evidence Act. The modified Section 38 allows government to withhold 
a vast amount of information from the participants in a wide-variety of judicial pro­
ceedings in Canada, including criminal trials, extradition proceedings, and refugee 
hearings.10 Even more problematic than the fact that Section 38 forces participants to 
apply to the court to force disclosure of information, however, is the fact that the 
courts can order the parties to keep the very occurrence of a disclosure hearing 
secret.11
For example, in January of 2002, the RCMP executed a search warrant at the 
home of Abdullah Almalki in Ottawa.12 On a trip to Syria to visit his parents a few 
months later, Almalki was arrested by Syrian officials, detained, and possibly tor­
tured.13 As part of an inquiry into the relationship between the RCMP search of 
Almalki’s home and his subsequent arrest in Syria, Almalki’s lawyers and represen­
tatives of the Ottawa Citizen newspaper asked to see the information the RCMP used 
to obtain its search warrant.14 The general rule in Canadian law is that, once exe­
cuted, the information used to obtain a search warrant must be made publicly avail­
able.15 According to news reports at the time, the Crown was considering using
8 See ibid., s. 78.
9 Bill C-ll removed many of the safeguards that existed in the prior security certificate process. For 
example, before C-ll was passed on November 1, 2001, the Security Intelligence Review Committee 
(the special oversight body for CSIS) was required to investigate and issue a report before a security 
certificate for permanent residents could be issued, and an adverse decision of the Federal Court did 
not act as an immediate removal order. C-ll removed both of these safeguards.
10 See Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1895, c. C-5, ss. 38.01-02.
11 See ibid., s. 38.02(l)(c).
12 See Joe Paraskevas, “Amalki Search Warrants May Be Sealed, Lawyer Warns” Ottawa Citizen (17 
November 2003) [Paraskevas],
13 See ibid. Recently, Almalki was acquitted of all charges in a Syrian court, but ordered to perform
30 months of military service. See Michelle Shephard, “Ottawa Engineer Acquitted in Syria” Toronto 
Star (27 July 2004).
14 See ibid.
‘5 See A-G Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre (1982), 65 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (S.C.C.).
Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act to keep the Almalki search warrant applica­
tion sealed.16 Did the Crown invoke Section 38? Was litigation initiated by the 
Ottawa Citizen or Almalki’s lawyers to challenge the use of Section 38? The truth is 
that the public simply did not know until the issue was finally decided and the court 
released an opinion. “Under the current law, no one is to disclose that a notice of 
application under section 38 has been filed with the Federal Court. Put simply, not 
even the Court can acknowledge publicly that it is seized of a section 38 proceed­
ing.”17
Together, security certificates and the use of Section 38 of the Canada 
Evidence Act represent an alarming trend. These two expanded areas of government 
power constitute a veil of secrecy that increasingly shrouds judicial proceedings and 
prevents public access to government information. Although the Federal Court of 
Appeal recently examined the constitutionality of security certificates,18 the use of 
Section 38 remains largely unexamined by both Canadian courts and scholars. In 
this note, I will consider the effects of the modified Section 38 on civil liberties in 
Canada. I will begin by explaining why open courts and access to information are 
essential to effective democracy and to fairness for accused individuals. I will then 
proceed to examine Section 38 in detail. Finally, I will consider alternative mecha­
nisms to those contained in Section 38 and explain how they can do a better job of 
both protecting the government’s interest in national security and promoting the pub­
lic’s interest in overseeing government activity.
II. THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW
The principle that court proceedings and documents are open to the public is “fun­
damental to our system of justice”19 and “is deeply embedded in the common law tra­
dition.”20 The traditional rationale for this principle is that “it is a restraint on arbi­
trary action by those who govern and by the powerful”.21 As the Supreme Court of 
Canada has stated:
16 See Paraskevas, supra note 12.
17 See Ottawa Citizen Group Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1303 at para. 35.
18 See Charkaoui (Re), [2004] F.C.J. No. 2060.
19 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at para. 27 (per Cory, J.).
20 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (A.G.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 at para. 21.
21 See Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No. 1) (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.) (“There can be no doubt 
that the openness of the courts to the public is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society. Public 
accessibility to the courts was and is a felt necessity; it is a restraint on arbitrary action by those who 
govern and by the powerful”).
There can be no doubt that the courts play an important role in any democratic 
society. They are the forum not only for the resolution of disputes between cit­
izens, but for the resolution of disputes between the citizens and the state in all 
its manifestations. The more complex society becomes, the more important 
becomes the function of the courts. As a result of their significance, the courts 
must be open to public scrutiny and to public criticism of their operation by the 
public.22
While the courts clearly acknowledge that public access to court proceedings and 
documents is necessary for effective public oversight of the judicial system,23 anoth­
er benefit derives from such access as well. Public access also allows for civilian 
oversight of law enforcement activity. Access to court documents like search war­
rant applications, affidavits, and transcripts of testimony all provide otherwise 
unavailable insight into the day-to-day activities of police officers. Because “[t]he 
tactics used by police, along with other aspects of their operations, is a matter that is 
presumptively of public concem[,]”24 restrictions on public access to court proceed­
ings “seriously deprives the Canadian public of its ability to know of and be able to 
respond to police practices that, left unchecked, could erode the fabric of Canadian 
society and democracy.”25
An open press is vital for public awareness of judicial activity.26 “The press 
must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, 
seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.”27 
Publication bans, such as those authorized by the Criminal Code and Section 38 of 
the Canada Evidence Act, are a severe limitation on freedom of the press and the con­
22 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at para. 5 (per Cory, J.) 
[Edmonton Journal].
23 See ibid. at para. 10 (“Discussion of court cases and constructive criticism of court proceedings is 
dependent upon the receipt by the public of information as to what transpired in court”).
24 R v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 at para. 50.
25 Ibid. at para. 51.
26 See Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (A.G.), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 at para. 23. (“That 
the right of the public to information relating to court proceedings, and the corollary right to put for­
ward opinions pertaining to the courts, depend on the freedom of the press to transmit this information 
is fundamental to an understanding of the importance of that freedom”). See also, Peter W. Hogg, 
Constitutional Law o f Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at §40.13(b). (freedom of the press 
includes “the freedom to publish reports of proceedings in court”). Freedom of the press is, of course, 
protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. Additionally, s. 11(d) of the Charter guar­
antees public hearings for persons charged with criminal offences.
27 Edmonton Journal, supra note 22 at para. 9. The same arguments apply to press access to court doc­
uments and to pre-trial proceedings. See ibid. at para. 11. See also Southam Inc. v. Coulter ( 1990), 75 
O.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.) (“I do not think that it is reasonable to distinguish between pre-trial proceedings and 
trial proceedings”).
comitant right of the public to be informed about government activities. These con­
siderations have led the Supreme Court to conclude that:
The importance of freedom of expression and of public access to the courts 
through the press reports of the evidence, arguments and the conduct of judges 
and judicial officers is of such paramount importance that any interference with 
it must be of a minimal nature.28
III. THE INTERESTS OF THE ACCUSED
At the same time that public access to judicial proceedings promotes public account­
ability and democratic oversight, it also furthers the interests of the participants in 
those proceedings. Public knowledge of what transpires in the courtroom forces 
judges and attorneys to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. It requires that 
judges and attorneys institute fair procedures and give an accused individual a rea­
sonable chance to respond to the government’s charges. According to the Supreme 
Court, public scrutiny of court proceedings helps the accused in two important ways:
First, it ensures that the judicial system remains in the business of conducting 
fair trials, not mere show trials or proceedings in which conviction is a foregone 
conclusion. The supervision of the public ensures that the state does not abuse 
the public’s right to be presumed innocent, and does not institute unfair proce­
dures. Second, it can vindicate an accused person who is acquitted, particularly 
when the acquittal is surprising and perhaps shocking to the public.29
Although public hearings are a necessary step in a fair judicial process, they are not 
sufficient in themselves. An accused individual must not only have access to the 
information used against him or her, but must also be able to force the government 
to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence and be able to present that evidence, 
even if this necessitates compelling witnesses to testify. As I will explain, the use of 
Section 38 to prevent the disclosure of potentially exculpatory information represents 
a substantial threat to the fundamental underpinning of the adversary process: the
28 Edmonton Journal, supra note 22 at para. 28.
29 r  u Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 at paras. 53-54. See also, Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), 
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at para. 58 (per Wilson, J.) (“Another reason for allowing the press to provide 
complete accounts of what goes on in the courtroom is that an open trial is more likely to ensure that 
the judge and jury conduct themselves properly so as to inspire confidence in the litigants that the pro­
cedures followed and the results reached are fair. In a criminal law setting the importance of an impar­
tial judge and jury is obvious and the role of an open trial in compelling judge and jury to act respon­
sibly has repeatedly been noted”).
right to make full answer and defence.30 The denial of this right is not a mere tech­
nical violation of the rights of the accused—it presents a real threat that innocent peo­
ple will be convicted of crimes they did not commit. The Supreme Court in R v. 
Seaboyer stated it well:
The right of the innocent not to be convicted is dependent on the right to present 
full answer and defence. This, in turn, depends on being able to call the evidence 
necessary to establish a defence and to challenge the evidence called by the pros­
ecution.31
This interest in having a full opportunity to state one’s case is not limited to tradi­
tional criminal trials—it attaches to any proceeding in which an accused faces a sub­
stantial deprivation of liberty, such as refugee hearings32 or mental health commit­
ment proceedings.33
Canadian constitutional, statutory, and common law has long embodied a pref­
erence for open hearings and for full disclosure of the evidence to an accused. The 
reasons for this preference are clear: open proceedings are more likely to be fair pro­
ceedings, and the public cannot exercise its obligation to ensure that justice is done 
if it doesn’t know what is going on in the first place.
IV. SECTION 38
A. OVERVIEW
Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act confers a broad power on government to 
withhold information from both the public and the participants in a wide variety of 
judicial proceedings. In addition, it imposes a duty on all private individuals who 
possess potentially sensitive information to notify the government and seek permis­
sion before disclosing any of that information in a proceeding. Secrecy pervades this 
notice-giving process. Under Section 38, the notice provided to the government, the 
government s response to that notice, and any hearings challenging government’s 
refusal to allow disclosure, can all remain secret. Although Section 38 proceedings 
allow for the adjudication of the vital rights of both the public and participants,
30 See R v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 at 336. (“The right to make full answer and defence is 
one o f the pillars of criminal justice on which we heavily depend to ensure that the innocent are not 
convicted”).
31 R v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 at para. 34.
32 See Singh v. Canada (Minister o f Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 215 (per 
Wilson, J.).
33 See R v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933.
knowledge of the proceedings is often limited to the Attorney General and a Federal 
Court judge. To all outside observers, it is as if nothing ever happened.
The statutory language of Section 38 is not straightforward. It contains sever­
al caveats and frequent uses the word “may” in reference to the discretion possessed 
by the Attorney General and the presiding judge. Further, the legislation sets forth 
vague standards for decision-making, and it is difficult to determine the applicable 
process to be followed from a casual reading of the statute. In this section of the 
Article, I will summarize Section 38 in detail and then discuss the cases in which we 
know the government invoked Section 38. After discussing several problems with 
the current statutory framework,34 I will suggest alternative formulations that better 
protect vital interests of the public and the accused.
B. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In order to adequately understanding Section 38, we must carefully analyse several 
key terms used in the legislation. First, the statute generally applies to all “partici­
pants” in “proceedings.”35 A “proceeding” for the purposes of the statute is defined 
as “a proceeding before a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the pro­
duction of information.”36 By its own terms, then, Section 38 applies to a wide vari­
ety of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, including criminal trials, civil trials, 
professional disciplinary hearings, public inquiries, and various sorts of “administra­
tive” hearings related to refugee status, extradition, or the reasonableness of security 
certificates. Second, a “participant” in a proceeding is simply someone who is 
required to or expects to disclose or cause the disclosure of some type of information 
in connection with that proceeding.37 This broad language covers not only the actu­
al parties in an adversarial process, but the parties’ attorneys, witnesses that expect 
to testify, and possessors of documents or other subpoenaed materials. Similarly, the 
language also covers municipal, provincial, or federal government agencies and their 
attorneys.
The Act contemplates two different kinds of information that may be withheld 
in certain circumstances. The first kind of information is called “potentially injuri­
ous information.” The Act defines this as “information that, if it were disclosed to the
34 In the interests of completeness, this Article will also discuss problems with Section 38 that are not 
directly related to secrecy.
35 Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 38.01.
36 Ibid., s. 38.
37 See ibid. (defining “participant” as “a person who, in connection with a proceeding, is required to 
disclose, or expects to disclose or cause the disclosure of, information”).
38 Ibid., s. 38.
public, could injure international relations or national defence or national security.”38 
The second kind of information is called “sensitive information.” The Act defines 
this as information “relating to international relations or national defence or nation­
al security” that the government possesses and takes “measures to safeguard.”39 
Although at first glance “potentially injurious information” and “sensitive informa­
tion” seem almost identical, the crucial distinction is that disclosure of the former 
“could injure” international relations, national defence, or national security, while the 
latter need only “relate” to those three concerns. The terms “international relations”, 
“national defence”, and “national security” are not defined in the Act.
Section 38 is triggered whenever a participant in a proceeding believes that any 
participant is about to disclose potentially injurious or sensitive information.40 Once 
triggered, Section 38 requires the participant to proffer written notice to the Attorney 
General of Canada and to the person presiding at the proceeding. The information 
must not be disclosed until authorized by the Attorney General or a Federal Court 
judge.41 The Attorney General may voluntarily authorize all or part of the informa­
tion to be disclosed.42 The Attorney General may also enter into an agreement with 
a participant that allows partial disclosure of the information subject to negotiated 
conditions.43 However, unless the Attorney General voluntarily permits disclosure 
or enters into an agreement with a participant, the only way to gain disclosure of the 
information is to apply for a court order from a Federal Court judge.44 Once an appli­
cation has been made, the judge must hear representations from the Attorney General 
ex parte and “in private.”45 The judge then has broad discretion to decide whether to 
hold a hearing on the application and, if so, who to invite to take part in the hearing.46
The judge may authorize disclosure of the information unless he or she con­
cludes doing so “would be injurious to international relations or national defence or 
national security[.]”47 Alternatively, the judge may release portions of the informa­
39 Ibid., S. 38.
40 See ibid., ss. 38.01(1) and (2). In addition to participants, “officials” who believe that potentially 
injurious or sensitive information may be disclosed during a proceeding may notify the Attorney 
General. See ibid., ss. 38.01(3) and (4).
41 See ibid., s. 38.02(l)(a).
42 See ibid., s. 38.03(1). The Attorney General has ten days after receiving notice to inform the par­
ticipant who proffered notice of whether or not disclosure is permitted.
43 See ibid, s. 38.03 (1).
44 See ibid., s. 38.04.
v  Ibid., s. 38.11(1) and (2).
46 See ibid., s. 38.04(5).
47 Ibid., s. 38.06(1).
tion or a summary if he or she believes that the public interest in disclosure out­
weighs any harm.48 The participant may appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal and 
to the Supreme Court but, in each case, the Attorney General is allowed to make ex 
parte  representations in private.49
Section 38 is a rare example of a statutory provision that does not give the 
Supreme Court the final say. If the Court’s ruling displeases the Attorney General, 
he or she may personally issue a certificate that prohibits disclosure, notwithstanding 
anything the Court may have said.50 Strangely, the Act contemplates yet another 
round of judicial review after the Supreme Court to determine whether to uphold a 
certificate issued by the Attorney General notwithstanding a Supreme Court ruling to 
the contrary. A participant may apply to a single judge of the Federal Court of Appeal 
for an order varying or cancelling the certificate.51 The applicant has the heavy bur­
den of demonstrating that the information restrained by the certificate does not 
“relate” to national defence, national security, or information obtained in confidence 
from a foreign entity.52 According to the Act, the decision of this judge is final and 
cannot be appealed to the Supreme Court.53
To summarize: participants in proceedings must notify the Attorney General 
if they expect that potentially injurious or sensitive information will be disclosed. 
Unless the Attorney General consents to the disclosure, a participant must seek a 
court order to force disclosure. The court may take into account the public interest 
in disclosure and balance it against the potential harm to “international relations”, 
“national defence”, or “national security” and fashion an order accordingly.
After a court has ordered disclosure and all appeals have been exhausted, the 
Attorney General may still issue a certificate prohibiting disclosure. This certificate 
is reviewable only by a single judge of the Federal Court of Appeal and the judge 
must uphold this certificate unless the certificate does not even “relate” to “national 
defence”, “national security”, or information obtained in confidence from foreign 
entities. Unlike the normal review process, use of the certificate power does not even
48 See ibid., s. 38.06(2). Notice that the provision here is given in the permissible form of “may” as 
opposed to the mandatory form of “shall”; a judge may order disclosure if he or she finds the informa­
tion would not be injurious to government interests or that the harm is outweighed by the public’s inter­
est. Presumably, this language would allow a judge to prohibit disclosure even if the information 
would not be injurious to “national defence”, “national security” or “international relations .
49 See ibid., ss. 38.09(1), 38.1, 38.11.
so See ibid., s. 38.13(1).
51 See ibid., s. 38.131.
52 See ibid., ss. 38.131(8)-(10).
53 See ibid., s. 38.131(11).
allow for the designated judge to balance the government’s interest in secrecy with 
an accused’s interest in disclosure, or to release the information in expurgated or 
modified form. Any information that ‘relates’ to one of the categories must be with­
held, simpliciter.
I will make further reference to problems with the substantive standards 
employed in Section 38 later in this article, but first I will address the secrecy that 
pervades the entire process.
According to the Act, no person may disclose the fact that notice was given to 
the Attorney General,54 that an agreement permitting limited disclosure was 
reached,55 or that an application to Federal Court has been made to force disclosure.56 
In other words, the Act prohibits not only the disclosure of potentially injurious or 
sensitive information, but also the disclosure of the fact that a controversy regarding 
unspecified information exists. This is akin to forbidding a media outlet from report­
ing that it has filed a legal challenge to a publication ban, or prohibiting an individ­
ual from telling people that he has decided to challenge the denial of his access to 
information request. As mentioned earlier, the Act also requires that all courts enter­
taining applications for disclosure must permit the Attorney General to make ex parte 
representations in private. Court records relating to litigation under Section 38 “are 
confidential”57 and judges may make any order “appropriate in the circumstances”58 
to maintain the confidentiality of information that relates to the proceedings.
From all appearances, the regime of secrecy created by Section 38 is vast in 
scope and likely unprecedented in the Canadian judicial system.
C. EXAMPLES
Only a handful of court opinions involving Section 38 have been released publicly. 
However, these cases show that government actively uses Section 38 to prevent the 
disclosure of information during judicial proceedings, even when non-disclosure 
presents a real threat to the right of an accused individual to make full answer and 
defence. From available case law, we know that the Crown has invoked the current
54 See ibid., s. 38.02(b).
55 See ibid., s. 38.02(d).
56 See ibid., s. 38.02(c).
57 Ibid., s. 38.12(2).
5»Ibid., s. 38.12(1).
version of Section 38 on at least five separate occasions.59 Three of these five occa­
sions arose from the same criminal case, while a fourth involved a civil suit for dam­
ages.60 A fifth involved an attempt by the media to gain access to sealed search war­
rants.61 These cases demonstrate that the problems with Section 38 are not academ­
ic or abstract but affect real people in real cases.
Government first used the new Section 38 during pretrial proceedings in the 
criminal indictment of Nicholas Ribic.62 Ribic was a Canadian citizen who was 
accused of taking hostages while a member of the Serb Forces in Bosnia. Ribic 
sought access to five documents held by the Crown pertaining to the situation in 
Bosnia at the time of the hostage-taking, and succeeded in obtaining an order for pro­
duction from the presiding judge in the criminal proceeding. However, the Attorney 
General of Canada refused to disclose the documents on the grounds that they con­
tained “sensitive” or “potentially injurious” information as defined by Section 38. As 
the statute provides, the Attorney General sought an order in Federal Court to con­
firm the prohibition on disclosure. A private hearing was held and ex parte submis­
sions on behalf of the government were tendered. The Federal Court judge exam­
ined each of the five documents in camera, considered the accused’s interests in dis­
closure and the government’s interests in confidentiality, and ordered that an expur­
gated version of one document be released to Ribic.
From this case, we gain a preliminary indication of how the government will 
likely use Section 38 in the future. Although Ribic made it clear that he was not seek­
ing access to information regarding the identities of sources, methods of information 
gathering, codes, or encryptions, the government still claimed that documents per­
taining to the disposition of forces almost a decade ago in Bosnia presented such a
59 See Canada (AG) v. Ribic, 2002 FCT 839; Ribic v. Canada (AG), 2003 FCT 10, aff’d, 2003 FCA 
246; Canada (AG) v. Ribic, 2003 FCT 43; Doe v. Canada (AG), 2003 FCT 38, aff’d, 2003 FC 1014; 
Ottawa Citizen Group Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1052. Obviously, a court decision 
is issued only if the Crown’s invocation of Section 38 has resulted in litigation and if the court’s reso­
lution of that litigation resulted in a published opinion; thus, Section 38 has likely been used far more 
frequently than the number of published opinions would indicate. There were also two decisions 
involving Section 38 issued shortly after the 2001 amendments, but the decisions are unclear as to 
whether the prior or current versions o f the statute were being applied. See Ribic v. Canada, 2002 FCT 
290; Canada v. Singh, 2002 FCT 460.
60 This case, Doe v. Canada (AG), 2003 FCT 38, aff’d, 2003 FC 1014, will not be discussed further as 
the court opinion concerns only procedural matters.
61 See Ottawa Citizen Group Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1052. The application for 
disclosure under Section 38 was dismissed by the Court due to simultaneous proceedings in the Ontario 
Court of Justice under an analogous provision of the Criminal Code. As only procedural issues were 
involved in the decision, this case will also not be discussed further.
62 See Canada (AG) v. Ribic, 2002 FCT 839 at para. 29 (thanking counsel for assistance in the first 
Section 38 application since the 2001 amendments).
serious, if unspecified, threat to national security or international relations that they 
must be withheld.
The result was similar when Ribic attempted to call two members of the 
Canadian Forces to testify.63 A Federal Court judge ordered a Crown attorney to 
question the witnesses ex parte, and then released heavily-edited transcripts of the 
questioning to the jury in lieu of live testimony. This occurred in spite of the long­
standing reluctance of courts to substitute mere transcripts for live testimony. For 
example, in Singh v. Canada, Justice Wilson noted that:
[W]here a serious issue of credibility is involved, fundamental justice requires 
that credibility be determined on the basis o f an oral hearing___ I find it diffi­
cult to conceive of a situation in which compliance with fundamental justice 
could be achieved by a tribunal making significant findings solely on the basis 
of written submissions.64
The Federal Court of Appeal approved this process in Canada (AG) v. Ribic, noting 
that, although it was “unusual”, the accused did not challenge Section 38 on Charter 
grounds.65 Subsequently, Section 38 was used to prevent full disclosure of a seven- 
minute videotape that the defendant already had in his possession and which the 
defendant had obtained independently. The video depicted NATO bombing runs in 
Bosnia in 1995.66
Apart from the fact that, on every occasion in which the Crown invoked 
Section 38 against Ribic, the Court allowed significant information to be withheld, 
the Section 38 process has another major downside: it is slow and unwieldy. Because 
a Section 38 proceeding must take place in Federal Court, it necessitates interrupting 
a normal criminal proceeding for as long as it takes to resolve the disclosure issue. 
Depending on the case, this may mean interrupting the criminal trial until the defen­
dant exhausts all appeals. Such delays can have serious consequences for the origi­
nal criminal trial. The trial judge in Ribic’s criminal trial, for example, declared a 
mistrial due to the time delays. Another judge almost dismissed the charges against 
Ribic on speedy trial grounds as over five years elapsed from the date of his arrest in 
May of 1999 to the scheduled beginning of his trial in June of 2004.67 The Court
63 See Ribic v. Canada (AG), 2003 FCT 10, aff’d 2003 FCA 246.
64 Singh v. Canada (Minister o f Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 213-14 (per 
Wilson J.)
65 See Canada (AG) v. Ribic, 2003 FCA 246.
66 See Canada (AG) v. Ribic, 2003 FCT 43.
67 See R v. Ribic, [2004] O.J. No. 2525 (S.C.J.).
attributed a significant portion of this delay to the Section 38 proceedings,68 a process 
the judge labelled “cumbersome” and “destructive of the trial process.”69
Although we are aware of only a few of the occasions when government has 
invoked Section 38, these occasions serve to reveal several problems with the current 
statutory regime. In the next section, I will discuss these problems in more depth and 
suggest possible solutions to some of them.
D. PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS
Even before Section 38 was implemented, lawyers, academics, and others interested 
in maintaining the proper balance between national security and civil liberties criti­
cized it heavily.70 My examination of these criticisms, the real-life cases, and the 
statute itself shows that Section 38 is seriously defective in a number of ways. The 
definition of the triggering mechanism as anything that “could injure” or “relate” to 
“international relations,” “national defence,” or “national security,” is overbroad. 
The triggering mechanism is also largely immune to judicial review. The secrecy 
inherent in the process severely derogates from the public’s right to access informa­
tion and the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. Finally, the Attorney 
General’s ability to issue a certificate to prevent the disclosure of information, even 
after the Supreme Court has ordered it released, is simply an unnecessary and dan­
gerous extension of government authority.
In recent decades, Canadian courts have tended to show less and less judicial 
deference to government claims of executive privilege.71 Section 38 reverses the 
effect of the common law trend. It does this by requiring parties to give notice of 
intent to disclose potentially sensitive information and by ensuring temporary non­
disclosure of any such information. One of the most serious problems with Section
6» See ibid. at para. 46 (attributing a year and a half’s delay to the Section 38 proceedings).
69 See ibid. at para. 49. This concern with delay is echoed in James K. Hugessen, “Watching the 
Watchers: Democratic Oversight”, in David Daubney, ed., Terrorism, Law & Democracy: How is 
Canada Changing Following September 11 ? (Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 2002). Hugessen writes that 
Section 38 “is certainly capable o f producing considerable delay and confusion in the proper forward 
march of a criminal jury trial” and that it is “an awkward kind of provision and it is not one that is par­
ticularly easy to administer.” Ibid. at 383. Although the question of delay will not be discussed fur­
ther in this Article, it seems like some form of expedited review or appeal of Section 38 claims should 
be instituted to enable adequate consideration of the issue while still protecting an accused s interest in 
a speedy trial.
70 See, e.g., Hamish Stewart, “Rule of Law or Executive Fiat? Bill C-36 and Public Interest Immunity” 
in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach, eds., The Security o f  Freedom: Essays on 
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) [Stewart]; Alan Leadbeater, 
“Antiterrorism and Secrecy” in David Daubney, ed., Terrorism, Law & Democracy: How is Canada 
Changing Following September 11 ? (Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 2002).
71 See Stewart, ibid. at 219.
38 is the overbreadth of its definition of sensitive information as anything that “could 
injure” or “relate” to “international relations,” “national defence,” or “national secu­
rity,” As Alan Leadbeater notes, “[o]ne would be hard pressed to imagine any oper­
ational information held by any of our investigative, defence, security, intelligence, 
immigration or foreign affairs institutions, which would not ‘relate to’ one or more 
of these three broad categories.”72 This clearly places a heavy burden on parties and 
witnesses in adversarial proceedings. Each piece of information held and subject to 
disclosure must be closely scrutinized to see if it even remotely “relates” to one of 
the three undefined subject matters and if it is the “type” of information Canada is 
interested in safeguarding.73 Speculation that some private individual somewhere 
may someday reveal something potentially damaging is simply not a sufficient justi­
fication for the imposition of such a burden. I submit that the triggering definition 
should be limited in a reasonable fashion to apply only to information that could 
“seriously” or “significantly” cause actual harm to Canadian national security or 
national defence. Harm to international relations should not be considered grounds 
for prohibiting disclosure unless it rises to such a degree that serious harm to nation­
al security or national defence would result. By narrowing the scope of the thresh­
old trigger for Section 38, participants in the Canadian judicial system will face a far 
more rational and far less burdensome obligation to notify the government before 
disclosing information, while still fulfilling their obligation to protect national secu­
rity and defence.
In a candid and informative speech given a few months after the passage of 
Section 38, Federal Court judge James K. Hugessen discussed the difficulties inher­
ent in adjudicating requests for disclosure under the statute.74 The primary problem 
from his perspective was that a key feature of the process consists of ex parte  and in 
camera submissions by the Attorney General:
This is not a happy posture for a judge, and you are in fact looking at an unhap­
py camper when I tell you about this function. Often, when I speak in public, I 
make the customary disavowal that I am not speaking for the Court and I am not 
speaking for my colleagues but I am speaking only for myself. I make no such 
disavowal this afternoon. I can tell you because we talked about it, we hate it.
We do not like this process o f having to sit alone hearing only one party and
72 Leadbeater, supra note 70 at 334.
73 For example, information that Canadian judges were involved in a bribery scandal at the Olympics 
could be withheld because it might harm the country’s “international relations”, or videotapes of atroc­
ities committed by Canadian soldiers overseas could be withheld because it might cause the public to 
agitate for troop withdrawal and harm our “national defence.”
74 James K. Hugessen, “Watching the Watchers: Democratic Oversight” in David Daubney, ed., 
Terrorism, Law & Democracy: How is Canada Changing Following September 11 ? (Montréal:' Édi­
tions Thémis, 2002).
looking at the materials produced by only one party and having to try to figure 
out for ourselves what is wrong with the case that is being presented before us 
and having to try for ourselves to see how the witnesses that appear before us 
ought to be cross-examined.75
Unfortunately, the inevitable result of an ex parte hearing is that the judge has no real 
choice but to defer to the assertions of the party before it, especially when it is 
assumed that that party is an expert on the issues involved.76 After hearing ex parte 
submissions from the Attorney General in a Section 38 proceeding, the designated 
judge may order a hearing and invite parties to participate. However, those parties 
will likely have great difficulty in effectively responding to the Attorney General’s 
comments because they will probably not know the nature of the withheld informa­
tion or why the information is alleged to be a threat to international relations, nation­
al security, or national defence.
Two different federal court judges involved in these kinds of proceedings have 
raised a possible solution:77 allow for the appointment of a special advocate in 
Section 38 hearings. Special advocates would be lawyers with security clearances 
sufficient to examine the withheld documents, cross-examine government witnesses, 
and take other steps necessary to argue against non-disclosure. They could be 
appointed to act on behalf of the public’s generalized interest in disclosure or on 
behalf of an accused’s specific interest in obtaining potentially exculpatory informa­
tion. Candidates for special advocate status could be drawn from the ranks of retired 
judges, attorneys for access to information or privacy departments, or esteemed
75 Ibid. at 384. Hugessen goes on to say that “when it is only given to us by one party we are not well 
suited to test the materials that are put before us. We hate hearing only one party. We have having to 
decide what, if any, sensitive material can or should be conveyed to the other party.” Ibid. at 384. Later 
in the speech, Hugessen argues that Section 38 proceedings cannot be analogized to applications for 
search warrants or wiretaps, because in those instances the material will be accessible to the public 
once the searches or wiretaps are executed; arguments or evidence submitted by the Attorney General 
under Section 38, on the other hand, will “never see the light of day [if successful] and the fact that 
something improper has been said to the Court may never be revealed.” Ibid. at 385.
76 See, e.g. Canada (AG) v. Ribic, 2003 FCA 246 at para. 19 (“the Attorney General’s submissions 
regarding his assessment of injury to national security, national defence or international relations, 
because of his access to special information and expertise, should be given considerable w eight. . . If 
his assessment of the injury is reasonable, the judge should accept it”).
77 See Hugessen, supra note 74 at 386 (“It does occur to me, however, that it might be helpful if we 
created some sort of system somewhat like the public defender system where some lawyers were man­
dated to have full access to the CSIS files, the underlying files and to present whatever case they could 
against the granting of the relief sought”); Canada (AG) v. Ribic, 2003 FCA 246, at para. 45 (approv­
ing of suggestion made by European Court of Human Rights for a “judge to appoint a special counsel 
to represent the interests of the person seeking disclosure”). See also, Tinnelly & Sons Ltd. v. United 
Kingdom (1998), 4 BHRC 393 (European Ct. Human Rts) (discussing the U.K. Special Immigration 
Appeals Act, 1997 that provides for special advocates).
members of the private bar. Although by definition they would be unable to work 
closely with their “clients” in crafting arguments regarding confidential information, 
the appointment of special advocates would still go a long way towards ensuring that 
judges presiding over Section 38 hearings hear more than just one side of the issue.
Section 38 prompts us to ask: how much secrecy is too much secrecy? We can 
understand why parties are prohibited from disclosing certain sensitive information 
until a court has ruled on the issue, but Section 38 also mandates that parties keep 
secret the fact that any proceedings are even underway. As Hamish Stewart notes, 
“[t]his level of secrecy goes well beyond what is necessary to protect the information 
in question.”78 There appears to be no legitimate government interest in forbidding 
the mere public acknowledgement that Section 38 proceedings are taking place. It is 
understandable why Section 38 prevents the parties and the media from discussing 
the content of Section 38 proceedings. However,it is not easy to see how disclosing 
the existence of Section 38 proceedings would harm “international relations”, 
“national defence”, or “national security.” This is equally the case where a criminal 
trial has been interrupted so a party can seek a ruling on whether an unidentified 
videotape could injure international relations,79 and where a public inquiry has been 
halted because the government has used Section 38 to withhold particular types of 
documents,80 Disclosure of the fact that notice has been given under Section 38 or 
that proceedings are underway would benefit the public in that it would allow for 
interested parties, such as the media, to attempt to intervene in the hearings. At the 
very least, such disclosure would inform Canadians about the scope and frequency 
of government invocation of the statute.
As troublesome as the secrecy provisions of Section 38 are, they are not the 
worst aspect of this legislation. Arguably, the most bizarre and excessive power 
granted to the government by Section 38 is the ability to order information withheld 
by issuing a certificate, even after the normal procedure for adjudicating the issue has 
been followed and concluded in the court system. The government faces a very low 
hurdle before issuing a certificate: the information must “relate” to “national securi­
ty”, “national defence”, or information obtained from foreign entities. A single 
Federal Court judge is allowed to review the certificate, but the standard of review 
does not inspire confidence in the process:
78 Stewart, supra note 70 at 224.
79 See Canada (AG) v. Ribic, 2003 FCT 43.
80 See Michelle Shephard, “Arar Probe Evidence to Be Screened” Toronto Star (30 July 2004) (noting 
that Justice Dennis O’Connor “is also dismayed that anti-terrorism measures in the Canada Evidence 
Act prevent him from making public any ruling to keep documents secret on national security 
grounds”). Indeed, although the Ribic line of cases indicate otherwise, it is not even clear from Section
38 itself whether rulings on an application for disclosure, as part of the “confidential” court file, can be 
legally disclosed.
This “relates to” form of judicial review does not authorize the reviewing judge 
to make any independent assessment o f the sensitivity of the information or of 
the Attorney General’s purpose in issuing the certificate. This form of judicial 
review is significantly less rigorous than the independent review of secrecy cer­
tificates available in our major allied countries. [It] has been aptly termed “win­
dow dressing” because it does not subject the Attorney General to any meaning­
ful accountability for the use o f certificates.81
It would be a poor lawyer indeed who could not convince a judge in an ex parte pro­
ceeding that information protected in the certificate “relates” to one of the protected 
categories. As Section 38 already provides for judicial review of non-disclosure 
orders, there appears to be no reason to give the government a second bite at the 
apple.
V. CONCLUSION
My analysis of Section 38, and of the certificate power in particular, leads to only 
one conclusion: Section 38 poses a serious danger to the civil liberties and constitu­
tional rights of Canadians. Further, “it is unclear why this extraordinary power, so 
easily susceptible of abuse, is required.”82 Section 38 should be amended or repealed 
as soon as possible. At a minimum, the threshold definitions used to trigger the 
statute must be narrowed, special advocates should be appointed to represent the 
interests of the public and of accused individuals, disclosure of the fact that pro­
ceedings are underway or that notice has been given should be allowed, and the cer­
tificate power should be eliminated.
81 Leadbeater, supra note 70 at 334. See also, Stewart, supra note 70 at 226 (criticizing breadth of cer­
tificate power).
82 Stewart, supra note 70 at 232.
